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We present a comprehensive study of utility function of the minority game in its efficient
regime. We develop an effective description of state of the game. For the payoff function
g(x) = sgn(x) we explicitly represent the game as the Markov process and prove the
finitness of number of states. We also demonstrate boundedness of the utility function.
Using these facts we can explain all interesting observable features of the aggregated
demand: appearance of strong fluctuations, their periodicity and existence of preferred
levels. For another payoff, g(x) = x, the number of states is still finite and utility remains
bounded but the number of states cannot be reduced and probabilities of states are not
calculated. However, using properties of the utility and analysing the game in terms of
de Bruijn graphs, we can also explain distinct peaks of demand and their frequencies.
Keywords: Minority game, adaptive system, Markov process, de Bruijn graph
1. Introduction
Minority game (MG) was designed [1] as a microscopic model of adaptive behaviour
observed in multi-agent systems. The MG is a typical bottom-up construct and
therefore usual definitions of the game first specify rules of behaviour for individu-
als. Then, piecing together microscopic variables, one defines higher-order quantities
characterizing grander systems. In some cases, however, other constructs are also
possible, e.g. functions of state like score functions can be attributed to groups
of agents without specifying agents individually (cf. ref. [2]). Despite simplicity of
basic rules of taking decisions by agents, adaptive abilities and phenomenology of
populations playing MGs appear to be surprisingly interesting and their properties
are non-trivial [3]. Special studies were devoted to understanding of such functions
like aggregated demand, market volatility, market occupancy etc. It was shown [4,
5] that the MG exhibits different modes of behaviour, depending on the game pa-
rameters: the random, cooperation and herd. The latter case is characterized by
small strategy space compared to the overall number of agents. Following authors
1
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of ref. [6] we prefer to call this regime efficient, because all players have all available
information at their disposal. Our study of this regime is motivated by interesting
phenomenology observed in numerical simulations and lack of satisfactory inter-
pretations of them. For example, the aggregated demand exhibits large-amplitude
oscillations [5] and periodicity in time [6, 7]. The crowd-anticrowd theory [8, 9]
presents acceptable explanation for oscillations but fails to deal with the periodic-
ity. This issue was treated by the authors of ref. [7] and, more fruitfully, ref. [2].
The authors of ref. [2] introduced the concept of the state of the MG but limit their
analysis to the reduced strategy space.
In our previous work [10] we found, in different context, that the crucial role
in explanation of observable behaviour in the MG is played by the utility function.
Therefore in this paper we further exploit the utility to study phenomenology of
MGs in their efficient regime. We find that the utility is bounded and the number
of states is finite, and prove these facts for the payoff function g(x) = sgn(x). We
can represent the game as a Markov process and we can substantially reduce the
number of states and calculate their probabilities. Then such interesting features
of demand like its strong inhomogeneity and presence of patterns in time can be
easily interpreted. For other payoff functions, e.g. g(x) = x, the number of states
cannot be reduced and distribution of utility remains irregular. In this case we
cannot explicitly calculate probabilities of states. However, using the same general
properties of the utility and representing the game as paths on de Bruijn diagrams,
we can also explain strong fluctuations of demand and calculate their frequency.
2. Formal definition of the minority game
At each time step t, the n-th agent out of N (n = 1, . . . , N) takes an action aαn(t)
according to some strategy αn(t). The action aαn(t) takes either of two values: −1
or +1. An aggregated demand is defined
A(t) =
N∑
n=1
aα′
n
(t), (1)
where α′n refers to the action according to the best strategy, as defined in eq. (3)
below. Such defined A(t) is the difference between numbers of agents who choose
the +1 and −1 actions. Agents do not know each other’s actions but A(t) is known
to all agents. The minority action a∗(t) is determined from A(t)
a∗(t) = − sgnA(t). (2)
Each agent’s memory is limited to m most recent winning, i.e. minority, decisions.
Each agent has the same number S ≥ 2 of devices, called strategies, used to predict
the next minority action a∗(t + 1). The s-th strategy of the n-th agent, αsn (s =
1, . . . , S), is a function mapping the sequence µ of the last m winning decisions to
this agent’s action aαs
n
. Since there is P = 2m possible realizations of µ, there is
2P possible strategies. At the beginning of the game each agent randomly draws S
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strategies, according to a given distribution function ρ(n) : n→ ∆n, where ∆n is a
set consisting of S strategies for the n-th agent.
Each strategy αsn, belonging to any of sets ∆n, is given a real-valued function
Uαs
n
which quantifies the utility of the strategy: the more preferable strategy, the
higher utility it has. Strategies with higher utilities are more likely chosen by agents.
There are various choice policies. In the popular greedy policy each agent selects
the strategy of the highest utility
α′n(t) = arg max
s:αs
n
∈∆n
Uαs
n
(t). (3)
If there are two or more strategies with the highest utility then one of them is
chosen randomly. The highest-utility strategy (3) used by the agent is called the
active strategy, in contrast to passive strategies, unused at given moment. However,
at any time all agents evaluate all their strategies, the active and passive ones. Each
strategy αsn is given the payoff depending on its action aαsn
Rαs
n
(t) = −aαs
n
(t) g[A(t)], (4)
where g is an odd payoff function, e.g. the steplike g(x) = sgn(x) [4], proportional
g(x) = x or scaled proportional g(x) = x/N . The learning process corresponds to
updating the utility for each strategy
Uαs
n
(t+ 1) = Uαs
n
(t) +Rαs
n
(t), (5)
such that every agent knows how good its strategies are.
3. Phenomenology
In order to examine MGs in the efficient regime, we performed a series of numerical
simulations with different combinations of game parameters, and chosen three most
representative cases: (m,N) = (1, 401), (2, 1601), (5, 1601), all with the number of
strategies per agent S = 2. All three games are in the efficient mode. In the first
two cases the condition NS ≫ 2P is fulfilled. In the third one it is not met and
consequences of this fact will become clear later in the text. In all three experiments
the full strategy space is used.
The effective mode is often called symmetric phase in the literature (cf. e.g. ref.
[11]) which means that both actions are taken by the minority agents with the same
frequency.
Figs 1, 2 and 3 present results for the steplike payoff function g(x) = sgn(x):
the time evolution of A(t), the autocorrelation function R(τ) and the scatter plots
of A(t + 2 · 2m) against A(t), respectively. The same results for the proportional
payoff function g(x) = x are given in Figs 4, 5 and 6.
Even a fleeting glance at Figs 1 and 4 reveals regularities in A(t) for both
payoff functions but more regular and distinct for g(x) = x. In this case their
period increases with the memory length m and their maximal values are equal
to the half of the population size N/2. This periodicity can be better seen using
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Fig. 1. Time evolution of the aggregated demand A(t) for three combinations of the population
size N and agent memory m: N = 401, m = 1 (left), N = 1601, m = 2 (middle) and N = 1601,
m = 5 (right). Simulations were done for S = 2 and g(x) = sgn(x). Preferred values of A are
visible for all three games.
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Fig. 2. Autocorrelation function R(τ) for three combinations of the population size N and agent
memory m: N = 401, m = 1 (left), N = 1601, m = 2 (middle) and N = 1601, m = 5 (right).
Simulations were done for S = 2 and g(x) = sgn(x). The highest values of R are for τ = 2 · 2m,
except for τ = 0, for all games fulfilling the NS ≫ 2P condition.
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Fig. 3. Plots of the aggregated demand A(t + 2 · 2m) vs. A(t) for three combinations of the
population size N and agent memory m: N = 401, m = 1 (left), N = 1601, m = 2 (middle) and
N = 1601, m = 5 (right). Simulations were done for S = 2 and g(x) = sgn(x). Apparent preferred
levels of A(t) are seen as clusters of points. For m = 1 and m = 2 points tend to flock around
diagonals indicating positive correlation for τ = 2 · 2m.
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Fig. 4. Time evolution of the aggregated demand A(t) for three combinations of the population
size N and agent memory m: N = 401, m = 1 (left), N = 1601, m = 2 (middle) and N = 1601,
m = 5 (right). Simulations were done for S = 2 and g(x) = x. Preferred values of A are visible for
all three games.
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Fig. 5. Autocorrelation function R(τ) for three combinations of the population size N and agent
memory m: N = 401, m = 1 (left), N = 1601, m = 2 (middle) and N = 1601, m = 5 (right).
Simulations were done for S = 2 and g(x) = x. The highest values of R are for τ = 2 · 2m, except
for τ = 0, for all games fulfilling the NS ≫ 2P condition.
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Fig. 6. Plots of the aggregated demand A(t + 2 · 2m) vs. A(t) for three combinations of the
population size N and agent memory m: N = 401, m = 1 (left), N = 1601, m = 2 (middle) and
N = 1601, m = 5 (right). Simulation was done for S = 2 and g(x) = x. For m = 1 and m = 2
points tend to flock around diagonals, indicating positive correlation, but clusterization of points
is not much pronounced.
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autocorrelation function R(τ) (cf. Figs 2 and 5) where τ is the correlation time. The
autocorrelation R exhibits statistically periodic peaks with periods T = 2 · 2m, as
has been already observed in the efficient regime in refs [7, 2]. The autocorrelation
is much less pronounced for games which do not meet the criterion NS ≫ 2P , as
seen in Figs 2 and 4 (right). Relaxation of this criterion spoils periodicity of the
aggregated demand. Similar observations can be done inspecting the A(t + 2 · 2m)
vs. A(t) scatter plots in Figs 3 and 6 where points for games fulfilling NS ≫ 2P
condition (left and middle panels in Figs 3 and 6) are stronger flocked around
diagonals.
Another interesting feature of the aggregated demand, seen in the one-
dimensional plots of A(t) and better in the two-dimensional plots A(t + 2 · 2m)
vs. A(t), is an existence of preferred values of A. These preferred values show up
as specles in the two-dimensional plots. The specles are better focused and more
numerous for g(x) = sgn(x) (Fig. 3) than for g(x) = x (Fig. 6).
Time evolution of the utility functions appears to be strongly mean-reverting
processes, independently of the payoff function, as seen e.g. in Figs 7. The more so,
for the steplike payoff g(x) = sgn(x) the utility is bounded to rather narrow belt
−2m ≤ U(t) ≤ 2m, where here and in Fig. 7 U(t) stands for the utility for any
strategy. The formal proof of this statement is given in chapter 5. This feature is
observed for any N and S, provided the criterion NS ≫ 2P is met.
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Fig. 7. Trajectories of the utility function U(t) for all strategies of the MG with S = 2 and
m = 1 and N high enough to ensure the NS ≫ 2P regime. Two payoff functions are shown:
the steplike g(x) = sgn(x) (left) and the proportional g(x) = x (right). Lines correspond to all
different strategies. Note difference of vertical scales between panels.
4. The concept of state
Since the MG represents system with many degrees of freedom, dimesionality of
states is expected to be large. In general, for each time step t, specification of state
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x(t) consists of:
A. The history of decisions µ(t),
B. The set of strategies of all agents {αsn}
s=1,...,S
n=1,...,N ,
C. The set of utilities for all strategies of all agents {Uαs
n
(t)}s=1,...,Sn=1,...,N ,
D. A function relating strategies to agents: ρ(n) : n→ ∆n.
Although the history of decisions µ(t) partially stores information about the past
of the process, transition probabilities depend only on the present state and the
process is Markovian.
Substantial reduction of the number of state parameters and simplification of
state description are possible in our case. Agents can use identical strategies a.
Expected number of identical strategies in the whole population behaves asymp-
totically, for N →∞, like NS/2P . The condition NS ≫ 2P assures that the game
stays in that asymptotic regime and the number of identical strategies is close to
its asymptotic expected value. Identical strategies have the same utilities over the
whole game, provided the initial values of strategies are the same, e.g. U(0) = 0,
for all strategies. It is thus enough to take into account only reduced set of pairwise
different strategies {βi}
2P
i=1 and utilities defined on them:
B. {αsn}
s=1,...,S
n=1,...,N −→ {βi}
2P
i=1,
C. {Uαs
n
(t)}s=1,...,Sn=1,...,N −→ {Uβi(t)}
2P
i=1.
Concerning point D, it is sufficient to find probabilities for agents to have strategies
from the set of pairwise different strategies. The probability that given agent has
any particular strategy from this set is equal to 1 − (1 − 1/2P )S . For large N , the
number of agents having this strategy is equal to N(1 − (1 − 1/2P )S). Therefore
point D, i.e. a function ascribing strategies to agents, corresponding to the agent
grouping tensor Ω of ref. [2], can be dropped out entirely in our case.
Finally, we describe states using µ(t) and the set of utilities for the complete set
of 2P pairwise different strategies {βi}
2P
i=1:
x(t) = [µ(t), U1(t), U2(t), . . . , U2P (t) ]. (6)
Similar description of state was used in ref. [2]. There are, however, two im-
portant differences between their description and ours: (i) the authors of ref. [2]
introduce a functional map giving time evolution of the system in any regime, and
(ii) they degenerate the game by following mean values of demand, thus making
the process deterministic and Markovian, and retaining possibility to randomize it
perturbatively. Contrary to them, we do not degenerate the game. We consider it
as a stochastic Markov process and eventually calculate the probability measure on
states for the steplike payoff.
aTwo strategies are called different if their Hamming distance is not equal to zero. The number of
pairwise different strategies is equal to 2P .
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Utilities {Uβi(t)}
2P
i=1, considered as functions of time, are called trajectories. In
majority of cases and provided the number of observed time steps is large enough,
strategies can be distinguished by their trajectories. The sufficient condition that
all 2P trajectories Uβi(t) (0 ≤ t ≤ t0) are distinguishable at t0 is that all 2
m
possible histories µ appear until then in a row. On the other hand, appearance of all
histories µ until t0, but not necessarily exclusively, represents a necessary condition
of distinguishability for trajectories. Examples of MGs in the regime NS ≫ 2P are
shown in Figs 7 where trajectories are plotted for m = 1 and S = 2 and for two
payoff functions further studied in this paper: g(x) = sgn(x) and g(x) = x.
5. Analysis of the minority game with payoff g(x) = sgn(x)
5.1. Finitness of the number of states
In this chapter we demonstrate that for any t the utility for any strategy is bounded
from the bottom and top: Umin ≤ U(t) ≤ Umax, where Umin(max) = −(+ )2
m.
Assume that at given time t two different strategies have the same utilities.
From eqn (5) for the steplike payoff function it follows that after one time step
these utilities can either differ by two units or remain the same. If the initial values
of the utilities of all SN strategies at t = 0 are the same and after τ time steps at
least one of them attains its extremal value, Umin or Umax, then the trajectories
cover the set of 2m + 1 values (cf. Fig. 7, left)
U(τ) ∈ {ul}
2m+1
l=1
= {2m, 2m − 2, . . . , 2, 0,−2, . . . ,−2m + 2,−2m}. (7)
Possible evolution scenarios leading to the values Umin(max) can be designed by
using transitions described in Appendix A. Using this notation we have u1 = Umax
and u2m+1 = Umin. The number of different strategies characterized by the same ul
is given by combinatorics as the number of trajectories starting from 0 and ending
at ul
#{βi : Uβi = ul} =
(
Umax
l − 1
)
, i = 1, . . . , 2P . (8)
The probability that the active strategy of the n-th agent α′n has utility ul is equal
to
P
[
Uα′
n
(t) = ul
]
=
{
1− P
[
Uα′
n
(t) < ul
]
, l = 1
P
[
Uα′
n
(t) < ul−1
]
− P
[
Uα′
n
(t) < ul
]
, l > 1
(9)
Using argumentation similar to that of ref. [9], but extended to the full strategy
space, one finds that
P
[
Uα′
n
(t) < ul
]
=
S∏
s=1
[
1− P
[
Uαs
n
(t) ≥ ul
]]
=
[
1−
#{βi : Uβi ≥ ul}
2P
]S
, (10)
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where, for t = τ ,
#{βi : Uβi ≥ ul} =
∑
j≥l
(
Umax
j − 1
)
. (11)
Denoting Pmax(min) = P
[
Uα′
n
(τ) = Umax(min)
]
, one sees from eqn (9) that Pmax >
Pmin. We notice that for any utility ul, different than Umin or Umax, the number
of different strategies (8) is even. Even more, a half of strategies corresponding
to each level Umin < ul < Umax suggest the opposite action than another half.
According to eqn (9), if two (or more) strategies have the same utility, then all
have the same probability to be the best strategies for the n-th agent. This means
that, if one excludes the best and the worst strategies, a half of remaining strategies
recommends the same action as the best or the worst strategy. Hence the probability
that an agent plays according to the strategy suggesting the same action as the best
strategy is equal to
P
[
aα′
n
(τ) = aαB (τ)
]
= Pmax +
1
2
(
1− Pmax − Pmin
)
=
1
2
(
1 + Pmax − Pmin
)
, (12)
where αB(t) is the best strategy from the whole set of strategies in the game, i.e.
UαB(t) = u1, and 1 − Pmax − Pmin refers to the probability that the agent’s best
strategy is neither the worst nor the best of all strategies. The factor 12 reflects
that a half of strategies with non-extremal utilities suggest the same action as the
best one. As Pmax > Pmin, from eqn (12) it follows that if one of strategies has
the utility Umax, then more than half of the population plays according to the best
strategy. Subsequently, this subpopulation loose and gets the negative payoff. The
rest are the winners and get the positive payoff. This mechanism bounds the utility
to stay between Umin and Umax. In addition, we know the formula for the fraction
of agents playing the same action.
5.2. Representation of the minority game as the Markov process
5.2.1. Case m = 1
In this case the complete specification of states and calculation of the transition
matrix are relatively easy. All strategies are listed in Tab. 1 and states are listed in
µ α1 α2 α3 α4
-1 -1 -1 1 1
1 -1 1 -1 1
Table 1. Strategies for m = 1
Tab. 2. At the beginning of the game we assume no a priori knowledge, so that all
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µ U1 U2 U3 U4 P(xi) EA(xi)
x1 -1 0 0 0 0
1
8 0
x2 1 0 0 0 0
1
8 0
x3 1 -1 -1 1 1
1
8 0
x4 -1 1 -1 1 -1
1
8 0
x5 -1 0 -2 2 0
1
16
3
8N
x6 1 0 -2 2 0
1
16 −
3
8N
x7 1 -2 0 0 2
1
16
3
8N
x8 -1 2 0 0 -2
1
16 −
3
8N
x9 -1 -1 -1 1 1
1
16
1
2N
x10 1 1 -1 1 -1
1
16
1
2N
x11 -1 1 1 -1 -1
1
16 −
1
2N
x12 1 -1 1 -1 1
1
16 −
1
2N
Table 2. States xi (i = 1, . . . , 12), their probabilities P(xi) and demands for m = 1. The EA(xi)
stands for the expected value of A for the state xi. The P and E represent a priori values, i.e. before
strategies are assigned to agents. After game initialization these values may become different and
depend on realization of the game but the sequence of states is preserved.
utilities are equal to zero, and two initial states are possible: x1 and x2. For these
two states the values of µ(t) are different. Subsequent time evolutions depend on
ratios between numbers of agents playing +1 or −1 actions and are illustrated in
Figs 11 and described in detail in Appendix A. These states and transitions are
sufficient to define a memoryless representation of the MG with a transition graph
displayed in Fig. 8. Some of its states have the same expected demand EA over
realizations of the game, e.g. EA(xi) = 0 (i = 1, ..., 4), as the same numbers of
agents play according to strategies recommending opposite actions. Using formulas
(9-11) we can find EA for all states (cf. Tab. 2), consistently with observations in
Fig. 3, where five clusters on the diagonal are found around values from Tab. 2.
Our process is a stationary Markov chain for which the stationary Master Equa-
tion can be solved with respect to the state probabilities. Their values are given in
Tab. 2, in the column marked P(xi) (i = 1, . . . , 12). The state probabilities from
Tab. 2 can be also used to find statistical periods of the demand
P
[
A(t) = A(t+ τ)
]
=
∑
ij
δ
[
A
(
xj(t+ τ)
)
, A
(
xi(t)
)]
· P
[
xj(t+ τ) |xi(t)
]
· P
[
xi(t)
]
, (13)
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Fig. 8. Diagram of the Markov chain representation of the MG in the efficient regime for m = 1.
If transitions to two states are possible from a given state, both a priori transition probabilities
are the same. This happens for x1 → x3,11, x2 → x4,12, x3 → x5,7 and x4 → x6,8.
where
δ(x, y) =


1, x = y
0, otherwise
(14)
The maximal value of 7/16 is found for τ = 4 and this explains why the largest
correlation is found also for τ = 4.
5.2.2. Case m > 1
Any MG with m > 1 in the efficient regime can be represented as a Markov process
with a finite number of states. The same method as for m = 1, but more demanding
computationally, can be used to calculate state probabilities.
6. Analysis of the minority game with payoff g(x) = x
Contrary to the MG with the steplike payoff g(x) = sgn(x), in case of the propor-
tional payoff g(x) = x the pairwise different strategies with identical utilities are
unlikely (cf. Fig. 7). This means that the probabilities that the pairwise different
strategies have the same utility is small compared to the case of g(x) = sgn(x). Con-
sequently, the probability that an agent has a freedom of choice of the next state is
negligible for g(x) = x. This means that such game is in a sense less stochastic than
for g(x) = sgn(x). Nevertheless, the game is still periodic because the number of
states is finite. A persuasive explanation of periodicity is proposed by the authors of
ref. [2] using de Bruijn representation of the memory sequences µ. Here we extend
their analysis and explain peaks of A(t) and their frequency using two approaches
based on the utility analysis.
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6.1. First approach
Dynamics of the MG can be efficiently studied using de Bruijn graphs, as shown in
ref. [11]. The decision history µ(t) is a sequence of m minority actions
µ(t) =
[
a∗(t−m), a∗(t−m+ 1), . . . , a∗(t− 1)
]
. (15)
The µ(t + 1) is obtained by adding a∗(t) to the right and deleting a∗(t −m) from
the left of the vector (15), such that there are two possible successors µ(t + 1) of
µ(t). If one history can be obtained from another one using this procedure, then the
latter has a directed edge to the former one. Histories may be represented by labeled
edges. These rules define de Bruijn graph of the order m. Examples for m = 1 and
m = 2 are given in Figs 9.
-1 1
-1 1
-1-1 1 1
1 -1
Fig. 9. De Bruijn graphs of orders m = 1 (left) and m = 2 (right). Dashed lines represent examples
of the Euler trails on the graph: one trail for m = 1 (left) and one of two possible Euler trails for
m = 2 (right)
Histories in MGs are not equiprobable [11]. Among all paths on the de Bruijn
graph of the game, Euler paths define the shortest sequence of histories where each
strategy looses and wins equally likely. In the non-Eulerian paths some histories are
more frequent and therefore some strategies are more profitable. We show in the
following that in the efficient mode the non-Eulerian paths are rare compared to
the Eulerian ones.
For the proportional payoff, prevalent number of strategies have unique utility.
In such a case, the probability (9) for the active startegy α′n can be simplified (cf.
also ref. [9])
P
[
Uα′
n
(t) = ul
]
=
(
1−
l − 1
2P
)S
−
(
1−
l
2P
)S
, l ≥ 1. (16)
Consider the case when A is the largest possible. Since {ul} is a sorted list of
utilities, this is possible if the first l/2 strategies in this list suggest actions opposite
to the last l/2. Then the probability of an action suggested by the best strategy is
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equal to
P
[
aα′
n
(t) = aαB(t)
]
=
2P−1∑
l=1
P
[
Uα′
n
(t) = ul
]
= 1−
1
2S
. (17)
This means that for large NS for about N(1 − 12S ) agents their active strategy is
the same as the best strategy and the expected absolute value of the aggregated
demand is equal to
|A| = N
(
1−
1
2S−1
)
. (18)
In particular, if S = 2 then |A| = N/2.
There is also more fundamental reason that the order of strategies in the list ap-
pears such that two halves of the list suggest opposite actions. We noticed that large
fluctuation of A is only possible if the game is in one of two de Bruijn nodes called
homogeneous, i.e. consisting of identical symbols: µh1(2) =
[
− (+)1, . . . ,−(+)1
]
. In-
teresting enough, peaks are observable only after one of the homogenous histories,
but not after both, as explained technically in Appendix B.
Since high A(t) appears only after the history µC , we have just two transitions
in the Eulerian path that starts from this history. From this it follows that the
frequency of peaks is equal to
f =
2
2m+1
=
1
2m
, (19)
in agreement with our simulations. The value 2m+1 is the length of the Euler path
and it corresponds to the period of A observed in Fig. 6.
Our argumentation becomes strict and eqn (17) is exact in the efficient mode
when NS ≫ 2P , ideally in the limit NS →∞. But we also observe cyclic peaks of
demand forN = 1601 andm = 5, when the efficiency condition is not met (cf. Fig. 4,
right). In fact, the condition NS ≫ 2P can be slacken off to the requirement that
the population is numerous enough that the game is in the herd mode. Games in
that mode do not follow Eulerian paths because for smaller N the pool of strategies
is too sparse and some histories occur more frequently. Nevertheless, the mechanism
of peak creation is approximately preserved, as long as N is large enough to cause
the split of utilities into two groups.
6.2. Second approach
At any time a somewhat simpler explanation may be given by dividing strategies
into two categories: the good with the positive payoff, and bad with negative [10].
Probability that an agent has no good strategies, or at least one good, is equal
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Fig. 10. The time evolution of the aggregated demand (upper left) and utilities for three cases:
an agent with one high- and one low-utility strategy (upper right), two high-utility strategies
(lower left) and two low-utility strategies (lower right) at t = 1000. These three cases may be
quantitatively distinguished using the values of utilities at t = 1000, corresponding to the location
of the first maximum of A(t) in the upper left panel. Simulation was performed for the MG with
N = 1601, S = 2, m = 5 and g(x) = x.
to 12S and 1 −
1
2S , respectively. Rapid fluctuations of demand are transferred to
similar fluctuations of the utility. The A(t1) fluctuates after the history µC = µ(t1)
when the strategies with higher utility indicate identical actions. If A(t1) strongly
fluctuates, then at t1+1 about N(1−
1
2S ) agents have at least one strategy with high
utility and they choose it. Strategies split into two groups of high and low utility
with a gap between these two groups (cf. Fig. 13 in Appendix B). Strategies with
high/low utility do not suggest the same actions, provided µ 6= µC , and therefore no
peak of A is generated. The µC has a non-vanishing probability to reappear at some
t2 > t1. All agents belonging to the group with at least one high-utility strategy tend
to react identically and A(t2) fluctuates maximally, i.e. A(t2) = N(1−
1
2S−1
). This is
illustrated in Fig. 10 (upper left), where for S = 2 we have A(t = 1000) = N2 . At t2,
all strategies with high U(t2) fail and get the penalty −A(t2), whereas those with
low U(t2) are rewarded with A(t2). After t1 agents are divided into three groups,
provided S = 2: the group with two good strategies, with one good and one bad, and
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with two bad. As seen in Fig. 10, at t = 1000 a quarter of the population with two
high-utility strategies evolves into two low-utility group (lower left), and vice versa
for another quarter with two initially low-utility strategies (lower right). Remaining
half of the population just swaps utilities of their strategies (upper right).
Results showing periodicity of A(t) from simulations become closer to the the-
oretical results for large NS/2P ratio. If it is small, then the game hardly follows
the Eulerian path and peaks of A(t) appear randomly.
7. Stochasticity of the game depends on initial conditions
We assumed that Uαs
n
(t = 0) = 0 for all αsn. This assumption seems natural as
reflecting no a priori preference for any strategy. However, it appears to be critical
for the MG dynamics for g(x) = sgn(x). Stochastic transitions mentioned in chap-
ter 5.2 show up for the degenerate state, i.e. more than one strategy with the same
utility. Removing this ambiguity suppresses stochasticity and the game becomes
deterministic. In such a case, our simplified description of the state fails because
strategies have unique utilities and cannot be aggregated. Consequently, the Marko-
vian treatment is no longer useful but its description in terms of de Bruijn graphs
becomes interesting. In particular, the game follows the Eulerian path on de Bruijn
graph. In case of the proportional payoff g(x) = x, the game is just deterministic
and follows one of the Eulerian paths.
8. Conclusions
We studied the MG in the efficient mode. We observe interesting collectivity in
agent behaviour in this mode. Depending on the payoff function g(x), the game is
driven by different dynamics which requires different methods of the analysis. In case
g(x) = sgn(x), provided the population N is large enough to assure NS ≫ 2P , the
MG can be described in terms of the Markov process with the finite number of states,
where transitions may be both stochastic and deterministic. This representation
completely defines dynamics of the game in the stationary regime and allows for the
calculation of state occupancies and other observables. The Markov representation
provides with an explanation of the periodicity and preferred levels of the aggregate
demand A(t). In practical terms this approach is tough for m > 1 due to the large
number of states. We failed to find any relation between the memory length m
and total number of states. Neither the simplified concept of state nor the Markov
process description are valid if the initial preference is given to any strategy.
For the proportional payoff g(x) = x, stochasticity of transitions disappears but
one still observes periodicity. One also observes distinct peaks of the aggregated
demand, exhibiting height equal to a half of the population, assuming S = 2. In
the herd regime, there always exists a history µC for which 1 −
1
2S
of agents react
identically and this is seen in the peak A(t) = N(1− 12S−1 ). We provided with two
compatible explanations of these phenomena. The first uses the ordered list {ul} of
2P strategies and is similar to the reasoning for g(x) = sgn(x). The second approach
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is a simplification of the first one to the case when only two classes of strategies are
used instead of all 2P classes. The second approach was also successfully exploited
in our analysis of the multi-market minority game [10].
We studied games with full strategy space. Some authors, e.g. refs [4, 14], re-
duce strategy space and reproduce many features of the full MG, e.g. behaviour of
σ(A)2/N . This trick, however, has serious drawbacks since it reduces the number
of states in the Markov description of the game and significantly affects its time
evolution. For g(x) = sgn(x), the Markov representation is oversimplified by such
reduction.
It this work we focused on theoretical issues of the MG with real histories. We
did not elaborate on application of our model to real-life systems, as e.g. financial
markets. At the moment, applications are more discussed by other authors [15,
16, 17, 18]. Perhaps the most general mathematical description of MGs with real
histories is given in ref. [19] using the generating functional approach.
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Appendix A. Transition scenarios for m = 1 minority game with
g(x) = sgn(x)
Possible transition scenarios for the m = 1 MG, represented as the Markov chain,
are illustrated in Figs 11. At the beginning of the game all utilities are equal to
zero. Depending on the history µ, only two initial states can exist: x1 = [−1, 0, 0, 0]
and x2 = [1, 0, 0, 0]. For each of these two states two further scenarios are equally
possible, because the utilities of corresponding strategies are the same. The choice
depends on the ratio between numbers of agents in two groups: one with a = 1 and
another one with a = −1. These scenarios are as follows.
Transition 1
Being in the state x1, the majority of agents use strategies suggesting a =
−1. Then
– the minority action in the next step is a∗ = 1,
– strategies α1 or α2 give negative payoff,
– strategies α3 and α4 give positive payoff.
The system goes to the state x3 = [1,−1,−1, 1, 1] (cf. Fig. 11, Transition 1)
where Uα3 = Uα4 = 1 and these strategies suggest different actions on the
last history µ = 1. Similarly, there are two strategies with the utilities
Uα1 = Uα2 = −1 suggesting different actions on µ = 1. Hence, there are
two equiprobable scenarios, further described as Transitions 3 and 4.
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Fig. 11. Trajectories of utilities for m = 1.
Transition 2
Being in the state x1, the majority of agents use strategies suggesting a = 1.
Then
– the minority action in the next step is a∗ = −1,
– strategies α3 or α4 give negative payoff,
– strategies α1 and α2 give positive payoff.
The system goes to the state x11 = [−1, 1, 1,−1,−1] (cf. Fig. 11, Transi-
tion 2) where Uα1 = Uα2 = 1 and give the same actions on the last history
µ = −1. Most of agents use these strategies (e.g. 3/4 of the population,
provided S = 2) and the sole possibility is that the system goes to the state
x2.
Transition 3
Being in the state x3, the majority of agents use strategies suggesting a = 1
and the system passes to x5. In this state Uα3 = Umax and Uα2 = Umin
(cf. Fig. 11, Transition 3). According to the reasoning from section 5.1, if
one utility attains its maximal or minimal value, most agents use strategies
suggesting the same action as the best strategy. Consequently, there is only
one scenario possible in x5: the best strategy, and all strategies giving the
same output as the best one, loose and the system goes to the state x4.
Transition 4
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Another possibility in x3 is that most of agents decide a = −1 and the
system goes to x7. In this state Uα4 = Umax and Uα1 = Umin (cf. Fig. 11,
Transition 4). Subsequently, the best strategy, and all strategies giving the
same output as the best one, loose and the system goes to the state x9. In
x9 both best strategies suggest the same for the last history µ = −1. The
majority of the population uses one of these best strategies and the system
moves to x1.
Transition 5–8
These transitions are analogical to Transitions 1–4, but the initial state is
x2.
Appendix B. Algorithm generating strong demand fluctuations
In Fig. 12 we present the flow chart illustrating appearance of strong fluctuations
of A(t). Below we describe the algorithm step by step. First three stages lead to the
first peak. Next steps explain why the subsequent peaks follow each other and why
they have opposite signs.
Stage 1
If A(t1) stands for the first peak of demand then three prior conditions
have to be fulfilled. The first is that µ(t1 − 1) = µh1(2), where µh1(2) =
[−(+)1, . . . ,−(+)1] is a homogeneous node.
Stage 2
It is also required that at t1 − 1 majority of agents decides to change the
node. If this is fulfilled then the minority action is
a∗(t1 − 1) =


−1, µ(t1 − 1) = µh1
1, µ(t1 − 1) = µh2
. (B.1)
Hence µ(t1) = µ(t1 − 1), the minority action is to stay in the same node
and gives the positive payoff to the winning strategy
Rαs
n
(t1 − 1) = −aαs
n
A(t1 − 1). (B.2)
Stage 3
There is a non-zero probability that strategies corresponding to the first
l/2 utilities in {ul} have won in the last step. Such circumstance is possible
provided stages 1 and 2 are realized. If this third condition is fulfilled then
we mark such history µC . Then all first l/2 strategies suggest the same
reaction after µC . Hence the majority decision at t1 is to stay in the node
and the maximal demand (18) is generated. All strategies with high utility
get the penalty and the low-utility ones are rewarded by the same amount.
The game follows the minority decision and escapes from the µC de Bruijn
node. When the game leaves µC , the strategy set is split into two groups
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Fig. 12. The flow chart of the MG evolution algorithm, illustrating appearance of distinct peaks
of demand.
November 20, 2018 5:14
20 K. Wawrzyniak and W. Wislicki
of high and low utility, as illustrated in Fig. 13. In the next steps the game
goes to µ 6= µC .
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Fig. 13. The time evolution of the utilities (left) and the aggregated demand (right) for the MG
with N = 1601, S = 2, m = 2 and g(x) = x.
Stage 4
Next steps do not substantially affect utilities as long as the history µC
does not reappear. There is no history other than µC assuring that the first
l/2 strategies in the {ul} list suggest a collective action resulting with the
most spiky demand. Hence, after t1, the variations of A do not affect the
utility significantly untill the µC reappears at t2 > t1 when the set of the
best l/2 strategies is the same as at t1. Then the l/2 best strategies suggest
the game to shift to another node characterized by history µ(t2 + 1) 6= µC
and the maximal demand |A(t2)| = N(1 −
1
2S−1 ) is generated. All the
l/2 best strategies get penalty proportional to the absolute value of the
aggregated demand. Concurrently, the l/2 strategies with the lowest utility
are rewarded with the same amount (cf. Fig. 13).
Stage 5
Next, the game follows the edge leading to the same node. Subsequently,
the l/2 best strategies suggest staying in the same vertex µC . Again, high
absolute value of demand is generated but the sign of A(t2 +1) is opposite
to the sign of A(t2). Consequently, all strategies with high U(t2 + 1) get
penaltyN(1− 12S−1 ) and, concurrently, strategies with low utility get reward
of the same size.
Stage 6
The game goes to the vertex µC(t2+2) 6= µC and the scenario from stages
4–6 repeats.
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Appendix C. Symbol captions
aα – action suggested by strategy α
a∗ – the minority action
αsn – the s-th strategy of the n-th agent
α′n – the active strategy, or the strategy of the highest utility,
for the n-th agent
αB – the best strategy from the whole set of strategies in the game
A =
∑N
n=1 aα′n – aggregated demand
EA(xi) – expected value of demand over possible realizations of the game
{βi}
2P
i=1 – set of 2
P pairwise different strategies
∆n – set of S strategies of the n-th agent
f – frequency of demand peaks
g – payoff function
m – length of the sequence of last minority decisions
µ = [a∗(t−m), . . . , a∗(t− 1)] – sequence of the last minority decisions
µC – history of minority decisions preceding first strong fluctuation of demand
µh1(2) = [−(+)1, . . . ,−(+)1 ] – homogenous de Bruijn nodes
N – the total number of agents in the game
P = 2m – number of possible realizations of µ
Pmin(max) – probability that the minimal (maximal) utility of any agent attains
the absolute minimum (maximum) value Umin(max)
ρ(n) – distribution of strategies for the n-th agent at the beginning of the game
Rα – payoff for the strategy α
S – the total number of strategies for each agent
{ul}
2m+1
l=1 – ordered list of different utility values when the extremal value of
Umin(max) is attained
Uα – utility of the strategy α
Umin(max) = −(+)2
m – the absolute minimum (maximum) value of the utility
x(t) = [µ(t), U1(t), . . . , U2P (t) ] – state of the game at time t
References
[1] W.B. Arthur, Am. Econ. Soc. Papers and Proc. 94 (1994) 406
[2] P. Jeffries, M.L. Hart and N.F. Johnson, Phys. Rev. E65 (2001) 016105
November 20, 2018 5:14
22 K. Wawrzyniak and W. Wislicki
[3] D. Challet, M. Marsili and Y.-C. Zhang, Minority Games. Interacting agents in fi-
nancial markets, (Oxford University Press, 2005)
[4] D. Challet and Y.-C. Zhang, Physica A246 (1997) 407
[5] R. Savit, R. Manuca and R. Riolo, Phys. Rev. Lett. 82 (1999) 2203
[6] M.A.R. de Cara, O. Pla and F. Guinea, Eur. Phys. J. B10 (1999) 187
[7] D. Zheng and B.-H. Wang, Physica A301 (2001) 560
[8] M.L. Hart et al., Physica A298 (2001) 537
[9] M.L. Hart et al., Eur. Phys. J. B20 (2001) 547
[10] K. Wawrzyniak and W. Wislicki, Adv. Complex Syst. 12(2009)423, arXiv:0809.3978
[q-fin.TR]
[11] D. Challet and M. Marsili, Phys. Rev. E62 (2000) 1862
[12] A. Cavagna, Phys. Rev. E59 (1999) R3783
[13] D. Challet and M. Marsili, Phys. Rev. E60 (1999) R6271
[14] Y. Li, A. van Deemen and R. Savit, Physica A284 (2000) 461
[15] D. Challet, M. Marsili and Y.-C. Zhang, Quant. Finanse 1 (2001) 168
[16] D. Challet, M. Marsili and Y.-C. Zhang, Physica A299 (2001) 228
[17] P. Jeffries, M.L. Hart, P.M. Hui and N.F. Johnson, Eur. Phys. J. B20 (2001) 493
[18] A. Tadeschi, A. de Martino and I. Giardina, Physica A358 (2005) 529
[19] A.C.C. Coolen, J. Phys. A38 (2005) 2311
